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Abstract 
We study how environmental regulation in the form of a cap on aggregate emissions from 
a fossil fuel (e.g., coal) affects the arrival of a clean substitute (e.g., solar energy). The 
cost of the substitute decreases with cumulative use because of learning-by-doing. We 
show that energy prices may initially increase but then decline upon attaining the targeted 
level of pollution, followed by another cycle of rising and falling prices. The surprising 
result is that with pollution and learning, the Hotelling model predicts the cyclical 
behavior of energy prices in the long run. The alternating trends in upward or downward 
price movements we show may at least partially explain recent empirical findings by Lee, 
List and Strazicich (2006) that long run resource prices are stationary around 
deterministic trends with structural breaks in intercept and trend slope. The main 
implication of our results is that testing for secular price trends as predicted by the 
textbook Hotelling model may lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the predictive 
power of the theory of nonrenewable resource economics.  
 
Key words: Dynamic Models, Energy Markets, Environmental Externalities, Global 
Warming, Technological Change 
 
JEL Classification: Q12, Q32, Q41 
                                               
1
 Respectively, University of Alberta (School of Business and Department of Economics), 
University of Alberta School of Business and Toulouse School of Economics, France. 
Correspondence: ujjayant@ualberta.ca. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
More than 90% of commercial energy today is supplied by the three major fossil fuels, 
namely coal, oil and natural gas. Each of these resources, in varying degrees, is a major 
contributor to environmental problems such as global warming. These resources are also 
nonrenewable. However, there are many clean substitutes such as solar and wind energy 
which are currently more expensive in the cost of producing a unit of electricity or usable 
heat. Empirical evidence suggests that the cost of these clean substitutes fall as they begin 
to acquire more market share (Argote and Epple, 1990). 
 
In this paper, we examine the substitution of a clean energy source for a polluting one in 
energy production. For example, solar or wind energy are clean but expensive substitutes 
for coal in electricity generation.
2
 The Kyoto Treaty or a similar international agreement 
sets a carbon concentration target or equivalently, a standard on the stock of pollution 
emitted from the use of coal.
3,4
 We ask: if there is significant learning in the clean 
substitute, how will that affect energy prices and the process of substitution?   
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 Even when plausible externality costs are accounted for, as pointed out by Borenstein (2008) in 
a detailed study of the cost of electricity from solar photovoltaics in California. 
  
3 Since fossil fuels account for 75% of global emissions (rest is deforestation) the effect of an 
international environmental agreement (e.g., the Kyoto Treaty) can be assumed to be a direct 
restriction on carbon emissions from the production of energy. 
 
4
 Many empirical studies on the effect of environmental regulation on energy use have concluded 
that the energy sector that is likely to be most impacted by climate regulation is electricity 
because it mainly uses coal, the dirtiest of all fuels. Clean substitutes for oil in the transportation 
sector or natural gas in residential heating (the cleanest of all fossil fuels) are much more 
expensive than the substitutes available in electricity generation such as hydro and nuclear power. 
That is, relative to coal, oil and natural gas have strong comparative advantage in their respective 
uses.      
 3 
Many studies have looked at the problem of nonrenewable resource extraction as well as 
learning by doing in new technologies. However, the focus of our paper is on the role 
played by environmental regulation in this substitution process, an issue not directly 
examined before.
5
 Specifically, we ask how a cap on the stock of pollution or 
equivalently, a carbon concentration target may affect the switch to the clean substitute. 
 
We characterize this problem by assuming a fairly general cost specification for the 
nonrenewable resource and the learning technology. Unit extraction costs for coal 
increase with cumulative depletion. The average cost of solar energy is assumed to 
decrease with cumulative use but increase with the quantity supplied each period. For 
example, the unit cost of a solar panel may decline over time, the higher the number of 
panels built in the past.
6
 But at any given time, the unit cost is increasing and convex with 
respect to the number of units supplied. This is quite realistic because as more and more 
solar units are brought into the market at any moment, they may have to be deployed in 
regions that are less favorable to solar energy such as those with lower incidence of solar 
radiation or in dense urban areas with higher installation costs. In our model, 
environmental regulation is imposed in the form of a cap on the aggregate stock of 
pollution. 
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 Except by a few studies described below. 
 
6
 This is consistent with historical evidence which suggests that cheaper production units will be 
brought online over time, gradually replacing more expensive units. For instance, McDonald and 
Schrattenholzer (2001) report average cost reductions of 5 to 35% from a doubling of cumulative 
production in solar and wind energy generation. Duke and Kammen (1999) also find significant 
reductions in average cost from a rise in the cumulative production of solar panels. 
 4 
There are several solutions to this model, which we describe in the paper. But the key 
result arises when the clean technology is used before regulation becomes binding.
7
 We 
show that in the initial period, energy prices rise because of scarcity and impending 
regulation. As soon as regulation becomes binding and the stock of pollution is at its 
maximum level, energy prices start falling. Clean energy use increases during this period 
but emissions cannot increase because of regulatory constraints. However there comes a 
time when resources are scarce enough that regulation no longer binds, and prices rise 
again, driven by the scarcity of the fossil fuel until it is no longer economical to mine 
lower grade deposits. This rise in prices also leads to an increased adoption of clean 
energy. Finally the polluting fossil fuel becomes too expensive to mine and the clean 
alternative takes over as the sole supplier of energy and once again, energy prices fall 
because of learning. 
 
In standard models of Hotelling, the price of a nonrenewable resource rises until a clean 
substitute is used. If the substitute is available in infinite supply and fixed cost, energy 
prices rise until this transition and then stay constant. When learning in the backstop is 
included, energy prices rise until the resource is economically exhausted then fall once 
substitution to the backstop has taken place (see Oren and Powell, 1985). We show that 
with both learning and regulation, energy prices may rise and fall successively.  
                                               
7
 Empirically, this may be the most plausible case. Carbon regulation is not yet binding in most 
energy markets and stylized facts suggest that clean substitutes such as solar and wind energy 
already occupy a small but fast-growing share of the energy market. For example the global 
market for solar photovoltaics was worth more than 17 billion US dollars in 2007, exhibiting a 
62% growth from the previous year (EETimes, 2008). The wind turbine market is even bigger, 
with revenues of $36 billion in 2007. It accounted for a significant 30% of new power generation 
in the United States in 2007, which along with Germany and Spain has the highest installed 
capacity (EWEA, 2008).    
 5 
 
This long-run cyclical behavior of energy prices is counter-intuitive and occurs because 
of the interplay of regulation, scarcity of the fossil fuel and learning in the clean 
technology. More muted but clear cycles in energy prices are obtained under other 
scenarios described in the paper, such as when the clean technology is deployed during 
the period when regulation binds or after it.  
 
A recent review of the empirical significance of the Hotelling model suggests that “its 
most important empirical implication is that market price must rise over time in real 
terms, provided that costs are time-invariant” (Livernois, 2008). It also points out that 
empirical tests of the model have been generally unsuccessful. Our results suggest that in 
the long run, resource prices may exhibit significant structural variations driven by 
regulatory policy and market forces, that may result in alternating phases with secular 
upward or downward price movements. This finding is supported by empirical tests of 
the Hotelling model over a long time horizon (1870-1990) which employ endogenously 
determined structural breaks in the data (see Lee, List and Strazicich, 2006). They find 
that resource prices are stationary around deterministic trends with structural breaks in 
slope and intercept. In other words, prices may show upward and downward trends, these 
trends broken by the endogenous structural breakpoints. They may not just be rising or 
falling, as predicted by the Hotelling model. Specifically, our results suggest that the 
same Hotelling model, when subject to regulation and learning effects, may predict 
alternating bands of rising and falling prices, and not a secular trend as is commonly 
assumed. In this sense, the results obtained here have a direct bearing on the literature 
 6 
that aims to empirically verify the predictions of the Hotelling model. It suggests that 
testing for a secular trend in prices may be akin to testing a mis-specified  Hotelling 
model.  
 
Although for convenience, the paper is motivated in terms of coal and a clean substitute 
such as solar energy, it is equally applicable to other settings, such as the monopoly 
production of oil by a cartel such as OPEC with a competitive clean technology (e.g., a 
hydrogen car). The solution predicts that oil prices may rise, followed by a decline when 
emissions become binding. They rise again when regulation ceases to bind, followed by 
an eventual decline when there is a complete transition to the clean substitute. What is 
surprising is that energy prices may start decreasing upon attaining the regulated level of 
emissions.  
 
In reality, there may be many short-run factors (e.g., speculation in commodity markets) 
that are at play in the determination of energy prices, but these results may at least partly 
explain the fluctuations in the prices of fossil fuels such as crude oil, natural gas and coal 
in recent years at a time when there is a general expectation that environmental regulation 
will bind at some time in the near future. The model then predicts that if say, the Kyoto 
Treaty imposed a target of 450 ppm (parts per million) of carbon,
8
 we would expect 
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 They are currently at about 380 ppm, not counting other greenhouse gases. Although the Kyoto 
Treaty mandates limits on carbon emissions, its ultimate goal is the stabilization of carbon in the 
atmosphere, as suggested by numerous studies of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(e.g., see Gupta, 2007). We model regulation as a limit on the stock of carbon, not on flow. In 
reality it is some combination of the two, if one considers the short term limits imposed by the 
Kyoto Treaty on emissions within a five year period and the long term goal of climate 
stabilization. A limit on the stock allows for arbitrage over time, and implicitly assumes that 
 7 
prices to rise initially but start decreasing as soon as this constraint becomes binding. 
When the constraint no longer binds and we fall below the 450 ppm level, energy prices 
will rise again, and finally fall when we make a complete transition to the clean 
substitute. The textbook Hotelling model, with learning or pollution regulation, does not 
predict this cyclical behavior.  
 
There is a large literature on the role of environmental regulation in generating 
endogenous technological change, and the importance of considering these incentives in 
setting policy. Arrow (1962) introduced the notion of learning-by-doing, where 
cumulative experience rather than the passage of time or directed investment leads to 
lower marginal production costs. Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (2002) demonstrate how 
policies change the long-run cost structure for the firm and drive innovation.  Popp 
(2006), Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2003), Nordhaus (2002), and Goulder and Matthai 
(2000) account for the potential for induced technological change in determining optimal 
climate change policy. Bramoullé and Olson (2005) show how new abatement 
technologies may be preferred to existing ones because of the dynamic incentives arising 
from learning-by-doing.  Like these papers, the dynamic incentives provided by 
endogenous technological change are important in our results, but we examine how these 
interact with resource scarcity and environmental regulation. 
 
Endogenous technological change has also been examined in the context of finite 
resource extraction. Tahvonen and Salo (2001) characterize the optimal extraction of 
                                                                                                                                            
damages are only a function of the stock. It may be important in future work to consider other 
more realistic but complex regulatory mechanisms, such as a hybrid flow and stock approach.  
 8 
finite resources when physical capital becomes more productive with use, increasing the 
marginal productivity of alternative and traditional energy sources over time. Their paper 
extends the literature that deals with learning in nonrenewable resources in the Hotelling 
(1931) model.  In particular, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) and Dasgupta, Gilbert and 
Stiglitz (1982) characterize optimal resource extraction rates when probability of the 
discovery of a substitute technology can be altered through investment. Oren and Powell 
(1985) develop a model of resource extraction in which the cost of the backstop declines 
with cumulative production. None of these studies consider environmental regulation, 
however.  
 
Recent work has also focused on the interplay between resource extraction and 
environmental regulation. Traditionally, the backstop is available in infinite supply and at 
constant cost. The entire economy instantaneously shifts from fossil fuels to the 
alternative energy source.
 9
 Chakravorty, Roumasset, and Tse (1997) apply the multi-
sector extension of Hotelling originally proposed by Nordhaus (1973) to show that a 
more realistic transition would see clean energy being adopted in those sectors where it is 
cost-competitive and as traditional energy sources become more expensive, more and 
more sectors will switch to alternative energy sources. Our model attempts to capture this 
gradual transition.  In each period, clean energy supply is upward-sloping, which captures 
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 Chakravorty, Magné, and Moreaux (2006) examine a similar resource extraction problem when 
regulation is set to cap the stock of emissions. They investigate how the clean backstop resource 
may be used jointly with the polluting nonrenewable resource especially when the demand for 
energy is nonstationary. However, in their model, there is no learning. This no-learning 
assumption may be restrictive given the long run nature of the energy transition process and the 
significance of learning effects over an extended time horizon (e.g., decades). They find that 
energy prices may rise and subsequently fall for a time when the demand for energy declines 
exogenously. The mechanism we consider in this paper does not depend on exogenous demand 
shifts but is based on learning in the clean substitute. 
 9 
not only the fact that a merit order of supplying facilities is present with an increasing 
cost structure, but also that the marginal product of alternative energy may vary by sector.  
As energy prices increase, ceteris paribus, more of the clean energy is used. This in turn, 
leads to learning, which lowers the cost of clean energy and thereby makes it cost-
competitive over more of the economy. 
 
Section 2 develops the dynamic model of a nonrenewable resource with learning in the 
clean technology. We discuss the necessary conditions and develop some basic insights. 
Section 3 characterizes the energy price paths and the sequence of resource use. Section 4 
concludes the paper by highlighting policy implications and limitations of the framework 
considered in this paper.   
  
2. The Model 
In this section we develop the Hotelling model with a clean backstop whose unit cost is 
determined by past experience with this technology. Let the utility or gross surplus from 
energy consumption be given by ( )U q where ( )q t is the energy consumed at any time t , 
which is the sum of the extraction rates for a polluting fossil fuel denoted by ( )x t and the 
consumption of the clean backstop resource denoted by ( )y t  so that q x y  .10 For ease 
of exposition, we denote the fossil fuel as “coal” and the clean backstop as „solar.” The 
utility function is strictly increasing and concave with respect to q , i.e., 0, 0q qqU U 
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 We sometimes avoid writing the time argument t to avoid notational clutter.  
 10 
and satisfies the Inada condition, 
0
lim q
q
U

  .  Denote the marginal surplus 
by ( ) ( )qp q U q and by ( )d p the corresponding demand function. 
 
The initial stock of coal is defined by 0 0X   and the residual stock at any time t is given 
by ( )X t , with ( ) ( )X t x t  . The unit extraction cost of coal is assumed to be of the form 
( )c X  with ( ) 0, ( ) 0c X c X    and 
0
lim ( )
X
c X

 . Thus ( ( )) ( )c X t x t is the total cost of  
coal at any given time. Coal use leads to pollution. Let there be a 1:1 relationship 
between coal use and the pollution emitted. We can easily re-work the model by 
assuming  units of pollution per unit of coal use, but that will not change any of our 
results below.
11
 The stock of pollution (say carbon) in the atmosphere is given 
by ( )Z t with initial stock 0(0) 0Z Z  . Its dynamics is given by  
 
( ) ( ) ( ( ))Z t x t f Z t           (1) 
 
where ( )f Z is the natural rate of dilution of pollution in the atmosphere. A higher stock of 
pollution implies a higher rate of dilution, i.e., ( ) 0f Z  . We model a carbon cap by 
postulating that the regulator sets a cap on the stock of pollution at 0Z Z .
12
 Thus at any 
time t , ( )Z t Z .  
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 For a model with two polluting resources with different values of  (e.g., coal and natural gas 
in electricity generation), see Chakravorty, Moreaux and Tidball (2008). Even without any 
learning, the price paths get quite complicated. 
  
12
 This cap may be the outcome of some negotiation process. The alternative way to model the 
externality may be to explicitly consider damages as a function of the pollution stock Z . 
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The unit cost of the clean substitute, solar energy decreases with cumulative production 
denoted by ( )Y t , i.e., 
0
0
( ) ( )
t
Y t Y y d    , where 0(0)Y Y  is the cumulative production 
of solar energy at the initial period. We specify this unit cost as ( , )g y Y . The total cost of 
solar energy then becomes ( , )g y Y y . We assume that for any 0y   and 0Y  , the unit 
cost ( , )g y Y  is strictly positive. We further assume that ( , ) 0yg y Y   with 
0
lim 0y
y
g

  and 
( , ) 0yyg y Y  .
13
 That is, increased use of solar energy raises its unit cost at an increasing 
rate. The marginal cost of solar energy is positive, i.e., [ ( , ) ] 0y
d
g y Y y g g y
dy
   . It is 
also increasing since 02][  yggygg
dy
d
yyyy . We further assume that 0Yg  and 
0YYg  with 
0
lim 0Y
y
g

  and 
0
lim 0YY
y
g

 .The average cost declines with experience, at a 
decreasing rate. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
However, the solution is generally determined by the shape of this damage function, which may 
exhibit a high degree of uncertainty. Our cap is in effect a limit form of a specific damage 
function – with low damages below the cap and high damages beyond. 
  
13 Most Hotelling models assume a constant cost ( 0yyg  ) in the backstop resource (e.g., 
Chakravorty, et al 1997). Constant costs over the quantity supplied will change many of our 
results. This point is discussed again below. 
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We also postulate that 0.yY Yyg g  The rate of change of average cost decreases with 
experience. Hence the marginal cost of solar energy given by yg g y  is decreasing with 
experience, i.e., [ ] 0y Y yY
d
g g y g g y
dY
    .14  
 
When the industry accumulates an infinite level of experience, then the average cost is 
given by the limit value lim ( , ) ( )
Y
g y Y g y

 with ( ) 0g y  and 0yg  and 0yyg  with 
0
lim '( ) 0
y
g y

 and 
0
lim ( ) 0
y
g y

  .15  
 
Let the social rate of discount be given by r . The problem of the social planner is to 
determine the optimal portfolio of energy sources over time. The planner faces an 
externally imposed and perfectly enforceable stabilization scenario which may limit the 
use of the polluting resource.  Specifically, the economy must respect a constraint 
( )Z t Z over an infinite horizon. We can now write the optimization program for a 
constrained social planner as: 
 
,
0
( ) ( ) ( , ) rt
x y
Maximize U x y c X x g y Y y e dt

          (P) 
                                               
14
 Although we discuss solar energy as a likely candidate for the clean technology, we avoid 
being very specific about the nature of the technology in this formulation. For example, solar 
panels may have a long life (30-40 years), in which case, at any given time, there would be an 
inherited installed capacity of solar panels, net of obsolescence. This will introduce complications 
in the model. However, we do not think that the results will change because all the solutions to 
the model imply increasing solar use over time, so the question of unusable capacity does not 
arise. Any technology that exhibits a unit cost that increases with the quantity supplied works, 
provided there are cost reductions due to experience.  
15
 The limit marginal cost ygg
y
  is increasing, i.e., 02][  yggygg
dy
d
yyyy
. 
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subject to 
( ) ( )X t x t            (2) 
( ) ( )Y t y t           (3) 
( ) ( ) ( )Z t x t f Z           (4) 
0, 0, 0x y Z Z    .        (5) 
 
The current value Lagrangian is given by 
yxZZZfxyxyYygxXcyxUL yxZ   )()]([),()()(  
 
where ( )t , ( )t  and ( )t  respectively, are the co-state variables attached to the three 
equations of motion (2)-(4) and ,x y  and Z are Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (5). We obtain the following first order conditions: 
 
q xU c                (6) 
q y yU g g y              (7) 
( ) ( )t r c X x             (8) 
( ) Yt r g y  
  and         (9) 
( ) ( ( )) Zt r f Z     .        (10) 
     
The complementary slackness conditions are 
0, 0, 0x xx x            (11) 
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0, 0 0y yy y            (12) 
( ) 0, 0 0Z ZZ Z Z Z             (13) 
 
and the transversality conditions are given by 
lim ( ) ( ) 0t
t
e t X t 

 ,          (14) 
0)()(lim 

tYte t
t
  and        (15) 
lim ( ) ( ) 0t
t
e t Z t 

 .         (16) 
 
The three costate variables capture the dynamic incentives created by resource scarcity, 
environmental regulation and learning-by-doing. Condition (8) is the usual Hotelling 
condition for the scarcity rent of the nonrenewable resource ( )t  when the unit cost is 
declining with the residual stock. The variable ( )t  in (9) represents the shadow price of 
cumulative production of solar energy. It is the benefit from currently consuming one 
more unit of solar energy in terms of future reductions in cost. Finally ( )t is the shadow 
cost of the pollution stock and is negative. Its rate of increase over time is given by (10).  
 
Note from (7) that when solar energy is being used ( ( ) 0y t  ), then 0y  so that we 
must have ( ) yp t g g y    . Recall that the average cost of solar energy is g and the 
marginal cost is yg g y . Since 0  , this means that price is less than marginal cost and 
 15 
therefore solar energy will need to be subsidized. Moreover if the average cost of solar 
energy is more than  , then the firm may be making a loss.16 
 
From (9), it is clear that the shadow price of the stock of cumulative experience  must 
increase over time. If over some time interval, there is no solar energy use, i.e., ( ) 0y t  , 
then  exhibits exponential growth, i.e., r  and rtet 0)(   where 0(0)  is the 
shadow price of the stock of the clean energy stock at the beginning of the planning 
horizon. Suppose solar energy were employed in an industry only after some delay, i.e., 
no solar was used over the interval 1[0, ]t . Then the right hand side of (2) becomes 
),0[,),0( 100 tteYg
rt   . 
 
Note that if the ceiling does not bind initially but will in the future, then 0Z  so that (9) 
yields ( ) ( ( ))t r f Z   which gives 



t
dZfr
et 0
))](([
0)(

  where 0 is its initial value 
at time 0t . Thus the shadow price of the pollution stock is strictly decreasing 
(since )0)(  Zf , i.e., its absolute value is strictly increasing. If the ceiling is not binding 
and will never bind in the future, then ( ) 0t  .  
 
3. Price Paths and Resource Use 
Because we have a ceiling on the stock of pollution, we have three phases of resource 
extraction – before, during and after the period when the ceiling is binding. We show that 
                                               
16
 Some part of the externality may be internalized by firms. Without an explicit micro model, it 
is difficult to provide further insights on this question.   
 16 
coal use must be decreasing everywhere except when the ceiling is binding. We also 
show that solar energy use must increase whenever it is in use. If the ceiling never binds, 
then the analysis is similar to the post-ceiling phase. In both cases, environmental 
regulation is no longer relevant, hence ( ) 0t  . Coal use will be declining due to 
Hotelling and solar use will be increasing because of learning.  
 
Before characterizing the solution, let us develop intuition by highlighting some specific 
cases that may arise. 
 
Before the Ceiling is hit 
If the ceiling is not binding yet, then ( )Z Z t hence 0Z   so that [ ( )]r f Z    . 
Suppose there is an initial period when solar energy is not used, and only coal is used. 
Then ( ) 0x t  . Hence from (6), p c     . Differentiating with respect to time, using 
(8) and cancelling terms gives p r    . Substituting from (9) yields 
( ) ( ) ( )U x x r f Z       so that 
( ) ( )
0
( )
r f Z
x
U x
   
 

 . That is, the use of coal 
must decrease as in the textbook Hotelling case. This is because of increasing scarcity 
and the marginal externality cost given by  which also increases over time. 
 
Now consider the situation when both energy sources are being used simultaneously, 
i.e., ( ) 0x t  and ( ) 0y t  . Differentiating (6), we get ( ) [ ( )] 0p U q q r r f Z         
which also implies that 0q  . The price of energy increases and aggregate energy use 
decreases. Now we examine what happens to the extraction paths of the two resources. 
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To do this, we differentiate (7), use (9) and cancel terms to get 
22 y yy yYp g y g yy g y r      . Substituting for p from above, we have 
2( ) [ ( ) ]
0
2
yY
y yy
r f Z r g y
y
g g y
     
 

  since the numerator and denominator are both 
positive. That is solar energy use must increase under joint use. The use of the 
nonrenewable resource is given by 0x q y     . Since aggregate energy use is decreasing 
and solar use is increasing, coal use must decline over time. The increase in the price of 
coal because of scarcity drives the increased adoption of solar energy. This effect is 
compounded by cost reductions achieved by learning. 
 
At the Ceiling 
When the economy is at the ceiling Z for an interval of time, coal must be in use, since 
emissions need to be positive and equal natural dilution as shown in (1). So )(tZ must be 
zero, hence we define ( )x f Z . This is the constant amount of coal use each period that 
will keep the stock of pollution at the ceiling. There are two possibilities at the ceiling 
depending upon whether solar energy is also being used or not. If there is no solar at the 
ceiling, then ( ) ( )q t x t x   and )(')( xUptp  . Coal use as well as the price of energy 
are constant. 
 
The more interesting case is when solar energy is being used at the ceiling. Note that the 
same amount of coal must be emitted each time period at the ceiling, otherwise the stock 
of pollution will not remain at Z . So ( ) ( )q t x y t  where ( ) 0y t  . This implies that 
 18 
0y  . Then from (7) and following the same procedure as before, we get 
2
0
( ) 2
YY
y yy
g y r
y
U q g g y

 
  
 since both numerator and denominator are negative. That is, 
solar use must be increasing at the ceiling while coal use will remain constant, by 
definition. Aggregate energy use will increase. When there is increasing solar energy use, 
( ) 0qq qq qqp U q U x y U y         . In other words, the price of energy when the pollution 
ceiling is binding must be decreasing. 
 
After the Ceiling Period 
There are three possibilities in the post-ceiling phase – only coal is used, both resources 
are used and only solar is used. Now the regulation phase is no longer binding hence 
there is no pollution stock externality. So the shadow price of the stock carbon is zero.17  
 
If only coal is used over some period in the post ceiling phase, then from (6) we 
have ( )p c X    which upon differentiation yields ( )p c X X r    using (8) and 
cancelling terms. Thus the price of energy is increasing and energy use is decreasing, i.e., 
0q x   . This phase is essentially a pure Hotelling path with a rising extraction cost 
function. This cannot go on forever because at some point, ( )c X  will catch up with the 
declining price of solar, given by 0(0, )g Y  (see equation (7)). 
 
                                               
17
 It can be shown that the ceiling can be hit at most over one time interval, since coal which 
causes the pollution gets scarce over time.   
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If both coal and solar are used simultaneously, then (6) continues to hold as ( )p c X   . 
Time differentiating gives 0p r  . Energy prices must rise and aggregate 
consumption must decline, 0q  . As before, we can use the necessary conditions to 
determine the rate of change of solar energy use with respect to time, 
as
2( )
0
2
yY
y yy
r g y
y
g g y
  
 

 , which is a special case of the pre-ceiling result with 
( ) 0t  . Since solar use is increasing and aggregate energy use is decreasing, then coal 
use must decline, 0x q y     . 
 
When only solar energy is being used, 0y  and using (7), we have 
2
0
( ) 2
YY
y yy
g y r
y
U q g g y

 
  
 . This is the same result as in the ceiling with joint use, except 
that instead of x x , now 0x   since no coal is being used. Then ( ) 0p U y y   . The 
price of energy must fall over time.  
 
As solar energy continues to be used, the cumulative experience in solar energy 
( )Y t increases with time. What is the limiting value ofY ? We have lim ( )
t
Y t

  and the 
average cost of solar energy approaching the limit cost ( )g y . In the limit the supply of 
solar energy is given by ( ) ( ) ( )p U y g y g y y    . Since ( )U y is downward sloping 
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and the marginal cost of solar energy is upward sloping, the solution is unique. Let us 
define this limit quantity as y .
18
  
 
The Ceiling is Never Active 
It is important to observe that the ceiling may not be binding at all, in which case the 
solution is a pure Hotelling model with learning by doing in the backstop resource. This 
may happen for instance, if learning effects induce significant substitution of coal by 
solar, so that the stock of pollution never builds up to the regulated level. If the solution 
to the model implies a path for the pollution stock ( )Z t that never equals the regulated 
cap Z for a non-degenerate interval of time, then the ceiling is redundant. In that case, we 
may have two possible outcomes depending on whether solar energy is used right from 
the beginning of the planning horizon or not. 
 
When solar energy is used from the beginning, the resource use profile is shown in Fig.1. 
During the initial period of joint use, ( ) 0p t  , ( ) 0q t  , ( ) 0x t  and ( ) 0y t  . Finally at 
                                               
18
 There exists a finite time xt at which the use of the nonrenewable resource is terminated 
provided that the cost of the clean substitute declines sufficiently due to cumulative experience.. 
Then since 
0
lim ( )
X
c X

 , the terminal condition that determines when no more of the coal is 
used is given by ( ( )) ( )x xc X t p t . As pointed out by Salant, Eswaran and Lewis (1983), the 
extraction period of coal may be infinite even if the inverse demand function is bounded from 
above, i.e., )0(p . In our case, the inverse demand is not bounded because of the Inada 
condition. But the residual demand of coal is bounded and decreasing over time. Therefore coal 
extraction over an infinite period cannot be excluded a priori. However, suppose the initial 
extraction cost of coal is very low relative to p , the price at the ceiling and this extraction cost 
does not increase significantly over a large part of the coal stock. Suppose also that the initial cost 
of solar is very high, but the limit price )(yg is lower than the initial extraction cost of coal and 
that this limit price is low over a large range of values of the solar extraction rate. If with given 
demand parameters, it takes a long time for solar energy to come “close” to the limit price, then 
he price of energy cannot increase forever. The necessary conditions for an infinite period of coal 
extraction will not be satisfied. This is the setting we consider in this paper. 
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time xt , coal is no longer used, and all energy is supplied by solar. Then the price of 
energy decreases and solar use increases because of learning. Note that the price of 
energy rises at first then declines. In the figure, (0)x may be more or less than y . 
Similarly, there is no a priori ordering of (0)q and y .  
 
When the ceiling never binds but solar energy is not deployed from the beginning, we 
may have three phases, as shown in Fig. 2. In the first phase [0, ]yt only coal is exploited. 
The price of energy keeps increasing while the true cost of solar energy given by (7), i.e., 
0(0, )g Y  keeps decreasing. The gap between them shrinks. Finally at time yt in the 
second phase solar energy becomes economical and both resources are exploited  at the 
same time. The price of energy keeps increasing and peaks at time xt when coal gets 
exhausted. Beyond this time, the price of energy keeps falling until infinity. Solar energy 
use increases and approaches an upper bound in the limit. 
 
There must always be an intermediate phase in which both resources are used. This is 
because the marginal cost of solar energy increases with the volume supplied at any 
instant, i.e., 02][  yggygg
dy
d
yyyy . Suppose that there is no joint use. That is, 
before time xt , there is no solar energy use and beginning at time xt , solar supplies the 
whole industry. Then at xt , there is a jump of solar energy consumption from zero to 
( ) lim ( ) 0
x
x
t t
y q t x t

   . That is at time xt , by condition (7), we must have 
0 0( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ) ( )x x x x xp t g q t Y g q t Y q t t   . Now consider the fact that ( )p t is 
 22 
continuous and increasing for xt t , r 
 by (9) hence 0( )
rtt e  for xt t and 
0 0( , ) ( , )g y Y g y Y y is strictly increasing in y . Then for xt t   where 0  is 
sufficiently small, there is a level of solar energy use y , 0 ( )xy q t  , which satisfies 
condition (2) with 0y  and 0 0( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )p t g y Y g y Y y t      . But this violates the 
fact that since solar energy use is zero before time xt , we must have 
0( ) (0, ) ( ) yp t g Y t     at time xt t   with 0y  . Similar arguments hold in each 
of the solutions described below. 
 
A Binding Ceiling 
When the ceiling binds over a non-zero interval, then solar energy may become 
economical before, during or after the ceiling. Consider the last case first. 
 
Solar Arrives after the Ceiling 
The price path and resource extraction is shown in Fig. 3. Initially emissions are higher 
than natural dilution, i.e., ( ) ( )x t f Z so the stock of pollution ( )Z t increases as given by 
(1). However because of rising resource prices, coal extraction and emissions decline and 
the higher stock of pollution means increased dilution since ( ) 0f Z  . Finally at 
time
ct t , emissions exactly equal natural dilution. In the following phase, coal use is 
constant, and the stock of pollution stays at the regulated maximum Z . Emissions equal 
x and energy consumption is constant. At the end of this phase, ( ) 0t  and is always 
zero beyond.  
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From time 
ct only the nonrenewable resource is used again, and the solution is pure 
Hotelling since there is no environmental regulation. Emissions fall below x and the 
stock of pollution begins to fall as resource prices rise due to Hotelling. All this time, as 
shown in Fig.3, the price of the clean alternative continues to decline but not enough to 
be economical. Finally at time yt we have 0 0( ) (0, )
yrt
yp t g Y e  . Both resources are 
now exploited, although coal use declines while solar use increases, driven partly by 
increasing energy prices and by learning effects.  
 
At time xt , coal extraction is complete with ( ) ( ( ))x xp t c X t implying that the scarcity 
rent of coal ( )xt is zero. Solar energy becomes the sole supplier of energy. A degenerate 
case may occur if 
0 0( ) (0, )
crt
cp t g Y e  , i.e, solar energy arrives exactly when the 
ceiling ceases to be binding. In this case we will not get a period with only coal use after 
the ceiling. This may happen if coal resources are limited or learning effects are higher in 
the solar technology. 
 
Solar Arrives at the Ceiling 
When the price of energy is high relative to the cost of solar energy, it is possible that 
solar energy may become economical when the economy is still at the regulated level of 
pollution. In this case, over the time interval [ , ]y ct t the use of solar energy must rise 
because of learning (see Fig.4). Since coal use must be constant, the aggregate 
consumption of energy rises, which in turn implies that the price of energy declines 
during this period of joint use at the ceiling. That is, ( ) ( ) ( )q t x t y t  , so that 
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( ) ( ) 0q t y t   and ( ) ( ) ( ) 0p t U q q t   . As before the shadow price of the pollution 
stock is zero at the end of the ceiling. The remaining path is similar to that shown in Fig. 
3. 
 
Here the price of energy fluctuates, initially increasing and staying at a peak, then 
declining and again increasing and decreasing over another cycle. 
 
Solar Arrives before the Ceiling - The Price of Energy Peaks Twice 
Perhaps the most interesting cases are those in which the solar energy arrives before the 
regulation binds. This may happen if the cost of solar is low relative to the price of 
energy or regulation is less stringent. Here we obtain two “peaks” in energy prices - one 
when the regulation begins and another when coal gets exhausted. There are two 
corresponding troughs in energy consumption, shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Coal is used initially until solar becomes economical at a price below the ceiling, i.e., 
0( ) (0, ) ( )y yp t g Y t p    . Both resources are exploited and the price of energy 
continues to rise. However, solar energy use expands while coal use declines although the 
emissions generated are higher than the dilution rate, so that the stock of pollution 
continues to build towards Z . Finally the ceiling becomes effective at time 
ct . The 
remaining path is similar to the previous case when solar arrives at the ceiling. 
 
We can broadly summarize the main results as follows: 
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Proposition: When a polluting nonrenewable resource has a clean substitute which 
exhibits learning by doing, the price path is single-peaked if regulation does not bind. 
Under binding environmental regulation, the price path is again single-peaked if the 
substitute arrives after regulation ceases to bind. Cyclical price trends are observed 
when the substitute arrives during the period when regulation binds. Finally, prices 
exhibit twin peaks when the substitute arrives before binding regulation. 
  
To understand the reason behind the cyclical behavior of energy prices, it is important to 
note that energy prices rise because of scarcity of coal resources. In the textbook 
Hotelling model, the price of a nonrenewable resource rises due to scarcity until it is 
substituted by the backstop. If there was learning by doing in the backstop, then the 
arrival of the backstop will trigger a fall in energy prices, thus the overall price path is a 
single peak. What happens in the present model is that when the use of coal is restricted 
because of regulation, solar energy use must increase because of learning. Thus aggregate 
energy use increases, which means the energy price must decline for some time. 
However, when coal reserves get sufficiently depleted, then there is not enough to coal to 
continue emitting at the ceiling, so the stock of pollution is off the regulated level. The 
textbook Hotelling model takes over. Coal use declines, and its price rises again. This 
leads to the second peak in the price path. In fact, coal gets exhausted precisely at the 
second peak, beyond which prices must again fall due to learning in the clean technology. 
 
Under what circumstances will the twin peaks in prices arise? They are likely when solar 
energy is relatively cheap, learning effects are significant and the environmental cap Z is 
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set at a relatively high level. For example, if solar is expensive and/or learning effects are 
small, it is more likely to become economical during or after the ceiling is attained, in 
which case the price cycles will not arise. If the environmental cap is relatively strict 
(low Z ) then again solar may arrive after the period when regulation is binding. The 
abundance and pollution intensity of coal may have the same effect. The more abundant 
the coal, the lower its price and higher the emissions. This is likely to postpone the onset 
of the clean energy because ceteris paribus, it becomes more expensive relative to 
abundant coal. The ceiling will be achieved earlier with abundance in the fossil fuel since 
pollution will be higher. Other parameters not considered in the paper such as the 
pollution intensity of the nonrenewable resource will have similar effects. A higher 
pollution intensity of coal is likely to hasten the arrival of the ceiling relative to 
deployment of solar energy.  
 
There is yet another case in which a similar cyclical price path is achieved, when solar 
energy arrives at the beginning of the planning horizon, at time 0t . This essentially 
implies that we will not have the zone with exclusive coal use at the beginning, and the 
rest of the extraction sequence remains the same.  
 
The assumption of increasing unit cost of solar energy each period is not only realistic 
from an empirical point of view, as we have discussed earlier, but also important for our 
results. If the unit cost were constant ( 0yyg  ) then there may be jumps in the supply of 
solar energy. The periods of joint use of the two resources may not occur, except when at 
the ceiling. The “twin peaks” result may not hold. More precise assumptions on solar 
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energy supply may be necessary before a complete characterization can be done, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
We consider the effect of environmental regulation on substitution of a polluting fossil 
fuel by a clean backstop technology, when the latter exhibits learning by doing. We show 
that the price of energy may exhibit cyclical trends driven by scarcity of the 
nonrenewable resource, the effect of regulation and cost reductions in the clean 
technology. Such price cycles do not emerge in traditional models of energy use.  
 
The textbook model of Hotelling with a clean backstop suggests that energy prices will 
rise until an instantaneous transition to the clean backstop. The model with learning in the 
backstop suggests in general that energy prices rise until economic exhaustion and then 
fall when the renewable is used. In our model prices rise, and then fall under regulation, 
then rise again with scarcity and finally fall with learning.  
 
In particular, what may be surprising is that energy prices may start declining the moment 
environmental regulation begins to bind. But once regulation is no longer effective, prices 
will rise, and finally fall upon transition to the clean substitute. The scarcity of a 
nonrenewable resource has a positive effect, since it drives the increase in the price of 
energy, which in turn accelerates the process of substitution and learning in the clean 
alternative.   
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This non-monotonic behavior of prices may explain, at least partly, some of the cyclical 
trends we observe in the long run movement of world energy prices. For example, Lee, 
List and Strazicich (2006) examine prices for eleven nonrenewable resources during the 
period 1870-1990. They conduct unit root tests with two structural breaks endogenously 
determined by the data. They find evidence that resource prices are stationary with 
structural breaks in slope and intercept.  
 
This implies that cycles that are a common feature in price movements of commodities 
such as crude oil may not be entirely due to macroeconomic phenomena or business cycle 
effects. The emergence of new energy sources and new substitution possibilities over 
time (Rhodes, 2007) may lead to repeated cycles in energy prices in the same manner that 
we have demonstrated in this paper. In order to better understand how the model 
proposed in this paper may explain some of these observed long run price cycles, one 
would need to extend this framework to explicitly consider substitution possibilities 
among nonrenewable resources. For instance, both coal and natural gas are used to 
supply electricity. Without recognizing these important features of the energy market, 
testing the textbook Hotelling model that predicts secular price movements may lead to 
incorrect conclusions regarding the predictive power of the theory of nonrenewable 
resources.  
 
For instance, our results suggest that the price of the nonrenewable resource may rise 
initially, fall and then rise again until economic exhaustion. However energy prices 
exhibit the twin peaks discussed earlier. So in a long run model with many nonrenewable 
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resources, it is likely that there may be multiple peaks. As prices rise because of scarcity, 
a new substitute may be deployed. This new resource may initially exhibit significant 
learning effects so that prices may fall. Ultimately, scarcity dominates the learning effect 
and prices rise, only to be substituted by yet another source of energy. Of course, for all 
this to happen, there may need to be some degree of uncertainty in terms of the 
availability of these new resources. Otherwise extraction could be ordered by cost and 
price movements will be secular. Moreover, it may not be important to have 
environmental regulation as in the present framework. Any increase in the cost of energy 
production say due to scarcity or a rise in transportation costs may be sufficient to 
generate price peaks but a precise model is left for future work. 
 
There are other limitations of the proposed framework that could be modeled. One is the 
growth in energy demand. It may be interesting to see how substitution of the clean 
energy may occur under exogenous demand growth, as is currently occurring in the 
global economy. The second issue is uncertainty which could not only be in the form of 
environmental regulation, but also the stocks of the fossil fuel and the cost reductions that 
could be achieved through an increase in market share of the clean fuel. Ex-ante, it is not 
clear how these uncertainties will affect the substitution process. Yet another issue 
completely ignored here is the endogeneity of research and development and the 
associated market structure – the nature of the fossil fuel industry and the clean 
alternative and how their interaction may affect the process of technology adoption. A 
fuller specification of the research process is needed to determine the precise effects of 
regulation. 
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An interesting issue that could be handled only with a calibrated model is the effect of the 
stringency of regulation on resource use. If the target is lax, or the cost of extraction is 
high or learning-by-doing is significant, then we are likely to obtain a single peak in 
prices and regulation will not bind. A stricter target implies that the fossil fuel and the 
clean energy co-exist for a period of time with the twin peaks in prices. A lower target 
raises the externality cost of the polluting fuel but also accelerates the substitution 
process. However, it is not clear ex-ante whether the twin peaks are higher than the single 
peak.   
 31 
References 
 
Argote, Linda and Dennis Epple (1990), “Learning Curves in Manufacturing,” Science 
247, 920. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1962). "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Review 
of Economic Studies 29: 155-73. 
 
Borenstein, Severin (2008). “The Market Value and Cost of Solar Photovoltaic 
Electricity Production,” CSEM Working Paper 176, Berkeley: University of California 
Energy Institute.  
 
Bramoullé, Yann and Lars Olson (2005), “Allocation of Pollution Abatement under 
Learning by Doing,” Journal of Public Economics 89(9), 1935-60.  
 
Chakravorty, Ujjayant, James Roumasset and KinPing Tse (1997), "Endogenous 
Substitution of Energy Resources and Global Warming," Journal of Political Economy 
105(6), 1201-1233. 
  
Chakravorty, Ujjayant, Bertrand Magné, and Michel Moreaux (2006), “A Hotelling 
Model with a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 30(12), 2875-2904. 
 
Chakravorty, Ujjayant, Michel Moreaux and Mabel Tidball (2008), “Ordering the 
Extraction of Polluting Nonrenewable Resources,” American Economic Review 98(3), 
1128-44. 
 
Dasgupta, Partha, Richard Gilbert and Joseph Stiglitz (1982), “Invention and Innovation 
under Alternative Market Structures: The Case of Natural Resources,” Review of 
Economic Studies 49(4), 567-82. 
 
Dasgupta, Partha and Joseph Stiglitz (1981), “Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the 
Speed of R&D,” Bell Journal of Economics 11(1), 1-28. 
 
Duke, R.D. and D.M. Kammen (1999), “The Economics of Energy Market 
Transformation Initiatives,” Energy Journal 20(4), 15-64. 
 
EETimes (2007), “Solar Market Grew 62% in 2007,” by Mark LaPedus, March 18. 
 
EWEA (2008), “US, China and Spain Lead World Wind Power Market in 2007,” 
February 15, European Wind Energy Association. 
 
Goulder, Lawrence and K. Mathai (2000), “Optimal CO2 abatement in the presence of 
induced technological change,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
39(1), 1-38. 
 
 32 
Gerlagh Reyer, and B.C.C. van der Zwaan (2003), "Gross World Product and 
Consumption in a Global Warming Model with Endogenous Technological Change," 
Resource and Energy Economics, 25, 35-57. 
 
Gupta, S., et al, (2007), “Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements”, in 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, U.K. and New York, USA. 
 
Hotelling, Harold, (1931), “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal of 
Political Economy 39(2), 137-75. 
 
Lee, Junsoo, John A. List and Mark Strazicich (2006), Non-renewable Resource Prices: 
Deterministic or Stochastic Trends?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
51, 354-70. 
 
Livernois, John, (2008), “The Empirical Significance of the Hotelling Rule,” Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy 2008, 1-20.  
 
McDonald A., and L. Schattenholzer  (2001), “Learning Rates for Energy Technologies”, 
Energy Policy 29:255-261. 
 
Newell, Richard G, Adam B. Jaffe, and Robert N. Stavins. 2002 , “The Induced 
Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 114(3): 941-975. 
 
Nordhaus, William (1973), “The Allocation of Energy Resources,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 3, 529-70. 
 
Nordhaus, William (2002), “Modeling Induced Innovation in Climate-Change Policy,” in 
Induced Innovation and Climate Change: Collected Essays, ed. Arnulf Grubler, Nebojsa  
Nakicenovic, and William Nordhaus, Resources for the Future Press, Washington, D.C. 
 
Oren, Shmuel and Stephen Powell (1985), “Optimal Supply of a Depletable Resource 
with a Backstop Technology: Heal‟s Theorem Revisited,” Operations Research 33(2), 
277-92. 
 
Popp, David, “ENTICE-BR: The Effects of Backstop Technology R&D on Climate 
Policy Models," Energy Economics, March 2006, 28(2), 188-222.  
 
Rhodes, Richard (2007), “Energy Transitions: A Curious History,” Stanford University: 
Center for International Security and Cooperation. 
 
Salant, Stephen, Mukesh Eswaran and Tracy Lewis (1983), “The Length of Optimal 
Extraction Programs when Depletion affects Extraction Costs,” Journal of Economic 
Theory 31, 364-74.  
 
 33 
Tahvonen, Olli and Seppo Salo (2001), “Economic Growth and Transitions between 
Renewables and Nonrenewable Energy Resources,” European Economic Review, 1379-
98. 
 
 34 
Appendix 
 
Determination of the optimal sequence when the ceiling constraint does not bind 
Here we only consider the case illustrated in Fig.1 in which solar energy arrives at the 
beginning of the planning horizon and the ceiling constraint is not binding. The other 
cases are similar and therefore are not examined separately. We show how the optimal 
paths for ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )x t X t y t Y t t and ( )t are determined in the first phase when both 
resources are used, together with the time xt at which coal use is terminated. The 
equations determining the above six variables are: 
 
)()( txtX             
( ) ( )Y t y t  
qU c             
q yU g g y            
( ) ( )t r c X x    , and       
( ) Yt r g y  
 . 
 
We need to have six conditions that determine the six dimensional vector 
( , , , , , )x X y Y   and another condition that determines the time xt  when the first phase 
ends. These are: 
 
0(0)X X  
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0(0)Y Y  
0 0( (0) (0)) ( )U x y c X      
0 0 0 0( (0) (0)) ( (0), ) ( (0), ) (0) ;yU x y g y Y g y Y y Y      given 
0
0
( ( ) ( )) ( ) )
xt
x xU x t y t c X x t dt

     
 
  which implies ( ) 0xt  . 
0 0
0 0
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( );( ), ( ) ( ), ( )
x xt t
x x Y x xx
U x t y t g g y t ty t Y y t dt y t Y y t dt 
  
        
  
   
( ) 0xx t   
 
Equivalently, the system of four first order differential equations in ,,YX  and  can be 
solved. They are as follows: 
 
( ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( )U X t Y t c X t t       
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )YU X t Y t g Y t Y t g Y t Y t Y t t     
      
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ))t r t c X t X t      
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( )Yt r t g Y t Y t Y t  
    
 
We need four points in the ( , , , )X Y   space to determine the solution. These are: 
 
0(0)X X given 
0(0)Y Y  given 
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0
0
( ( ) ( )) ( )
xt
x xU X t Y t c X X t dx

      
 
   implies ( ) 0xt   
0 0
0 0
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )( ), ( ) ( ), ( )
x xt t
x x Y x xx x
U X t Y t g g Y t tY t Y Y t dx Y t Y Y t dx 
  
         
  
        
Furthermore, at xt t , we must have ( ) 0xX t 
 , which determines xt . 
 
In the second phase, only solar is used. The corresponding differential equations that 
need to be solved for ( )Y t and ( )t are   
 
( ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )YU Y t g Y t Y t g Y t Y t Y t t   
     and 
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( )Yt r t g Y t Y t Y t  
    
 
together with the initial conditions ( )xY t  and ( )xt given by the first phase. ▪ 
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Fig. 1. Ceiling does not Bind: Solar is Economical 
from the Beginning 
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$ 
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Fig. 2. Ceiling does not Bind: Only Coal is used at 
the Beginning 
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Fig. 3. Solar Energy arrives after the Ceiling 
Period 
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Fig. 4. Solar Energy arrives during the Ceiling 
Period 
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Fig. 5. Solar Energy comes before the Ceiling 
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